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Are the Senses Silent? 
Travis’s Argument from Looks
Keith A. Wilson, University of Edinburgh
Forthcoming in Charles Travis on Language, Thought, and Perception, 
T. Dobler and J. Collins (eds.), Oxford University Press  
1. Introduction
Echoing Kant’s remark that “[t]houghts without content are empty, intuitions without 
concepts  are  blind” (Kant  1998:  A51/B75),  Charles  Travis  (2004,  2013a)  argues  that 
perceptual  experiences  are  not  only  ‘blind’,  but  ‘silent’  in  that  they  have  no 
representational content at all. For Travis, the role of perceptual experience — by which 
he means conscious  perceptual experience — is  to present aspects of  the world upon 
which truth may turn. Hence, “[i]n perception, things are not presented, or represented, 
to us as being thus and so. They are just presented to us, full stop” (Travis 2004: 65). 
According  to  Travis,  then,  perception  is  presentational  in  the  sense  that  it  makes 
perceptual  objects — for  example,  a  sunset,  or  the  sun’s  setting — available  to 
consciousness, but is not in the business of representing that anything is the case; e.g. 
that the sun is setting. The latter, being propositional, is not an object of perceptual 
awareness, but rather of thought or judgement (Travis 2013b). While such content may 
be  constitutive  of  beliefs  or  judgements,  which  are  typically  thought  of  as 
‘downstream’ from, or causally dependent upon, perceptual experience, to assimilate 
perception to a state of this kind involves a kind of category mistake that, for Travis, 
renders thought’s purchase on the world unintelligible (Travis 2007).
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The  view  that  perceptual  experience  is  representational  is  widespread  in 
philosophy and cognitive science.  However,  it  is  rarely explicitly argued for in any 
detail.  According to this  view, for  S  to  perceptually experience the world in some 1
sensory modality,  or  combination of  modalities,  is  a  matter  of  S’s  representing the 
world, or objects in it, as being some particular way. That is, perceptual experiences 
have  representational  content.  In  ‘The  Silence  of  the  Senses’,  Travis  (2004,  2013a) 
challenges this orthodoxy by arguing that experiences do not represent the world as 
being  any  particular  way,  since  they  are  in  an  important  sense  equivocal  or 
indeterminate between many possible contents.  Thus, although perception ‘presents 
objects’  in the sense of  making them available to the conscious subject,  it  does not 
present them as being some way or other, and so is not a representational or intentional 
phenomenon (Travis 2004: 93).2
In this paper, I examine one of Travis’s arguments — the argument from looks (sect. 2) 
—to clarify the nature of the challenge it poses for the representational view, and to 
highlight several possible lines of response. My aim is not to defend Travis per se, but 
rather  to  elucidate  his  argument  in  a  way  that  avoids  various  misunderstandings 
which have become prevalent in the literature (sect. 3). Once these misunderstandings 
are  corrected,  the  argument  can  be  seen  to  pose  an  important  and,  in  my  view, 
unresolved challenge for many (though not all) forms of representationalism (sect. 4). 
As such, Travis’s argument from looks places the onus upon representationalists to 
explain not only how experiences come to have representational contents, and what 
those contents are, but the explanatory role, or roles, that such contents are supposed to 
play, and how — or indeed whether — they are available to perceivers for the purposes 
of thought, reasoning and action (sect. 5).
 Examples of recent attempts to do so include Byrne (2009), Siegel (2010), Schellenberg (2011a; 1
2011b) and Brogaard (2015a).
 For further discussion of such views, see Locatelli & Wilson (2017).2
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2. Perceptual Representation
In ‘The Silence of the Senses’, Travis (2004; 2013a) targets the view that conscious visual 
experience  (hereafter:  ‘experience’)  constitutively  involves,  or  is  reducible  to,  the 
representation  of  mind-independent  objects  and  their  properties.  The  view  that 
experiences  have  representational  content — known  variously  as  representationalism, 
intentionalism, or the Content View  — is often contrasted with the view that experiences 3
fundamentally involve a primitive or unanalysable relation to the objects of experience. 
Variations of the latter view — known as relationalism, Naïve Realism, or the Object View 
— differ in emphasis,  but share a common commitment to the essentially relational 
nature of experience.  Furthermore, many relationalists deny that experience can be 4
analysed in representational terms, claiming either that the perceptual relation is non-
representational, i.e. anti-representationalism, or that the content that representationalists 
posit is explanatorily redundant. A third family of hybrid or ‘mixed’ views holds that 
experience possesses both representational and relational elements, thereby combining 
aspects of each of the preceding views. I do not consider hybrid views in detail here 
except insofar as they posit a representational element to experience, and so are also 
targets for Travis’s argument.
The notion of representation that Travis opposes — p-representation, as I will call it 
— may  be  contrasted  with  other  forms  of  representation  that  he  explicitly  allows. 
Causal covariation, for example, as occurs when light falls upon the retina forming an 
image of some external scene, might be thought to constitute a kind of representation, 
albeit  one  that  is  incapable  of  misrepresenting  except  by  some externally  imposed 
convention (see below). Similarly, the rings in a tree trunk might be said to ‘represent’ 
 Not  to  be  confused with the  distinct,  but  related,  view that  the  phenomenal  character  of 3
experience  supervenes  upon,  or  is  identical  to,  its  representational  content,  also  commonly 
referred to as ‘intentionalism’ or ‘representationalism’.
 Campbell  (2002),  for  example,  characterises  experience  as  a  three-place  relation  between 4
subject,  object  and  some  particular  standpoint  or  perspective,  whereas  Martin  (2002,  2006) 
emphasises the constitutive role of external objects in experience.
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the tree’s age, though the content of this representation is imputed by us, qua conscious 
observers,  and  not  by  the  tree  or  its  rings.  Here  again  it  seems  inapt  to  talk  of 
misrepresentation if — due to freak weather conditions,  for  example — the tree’s  age 
and number of rings do not coincide. Rather, under such conditions the rings might 
simply be said not to represent its age.  ‘Representation’ here functions as a kind of 5
shorthand that indicates the presence of a particular kind of cause. Following Travis 
(2014: 314), let us call such forms of representation effect-representations.
The possibility of misrepresentation typically arises via the appeal to some kind of 
standard function, or norm. Scientific explanations of the workings of various parts of 
the brain, such as the visual cortex, typically invoke this notion of representation in 
describing states or processes that carry information about some external stimulus or 
other  subsystem.  Here,  the  relevant  system  may  enter  a  state  that  is  normally 
associated with a specific cause as a result of a deviant chain of events — for example, 
by  direct  stimulation  with  an  electrode  —  thus  creating  the  possibility  for 
misrepresentation. Even where such representations casually impact upon the subject’s 
experience, however, their contents need not feature as the contents of any personal-
level cognitive state; i.e. they may be entirely sub-personal. Travis does not rule out the 
existence  of  sub-personal  representations,  nor  is  his  view  (pace  Burge  2005) 
incompatible with modern psychological or neuroscientific explanations of perception. 
Rather, the argument targets a distinctly philosophical notion of representation that is 
held by many, though not all,  philosophers who advocate representational views of 
conscious perception.
To gain a clearer understanding of the kind of representation that Travis has in 
mind, it is helpful to examine the conditions by which he characterises it, which are as 
follows (Travis 2004: 63):
 Alternatively, we might represent the tree’s rings as not indicating its age, where this further 5
representation is distinct from the rings themselves.
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(i) Objectivity: “The representation in question consists in representing things as so 
(thus, truly/veridically, or falsely/non-veridically).”
(ii) Face Value: “It has, or gives perceptual experience, a face value, at which it can be 
taken or declined (or discounted).”
(iii) Givenness:  “It  is  not  autorepresentation  [representation-by  the  subject].  (It  is 
allorepresentation [representation-to the subject], though here, not crucially.)”
(iv) Availability: “When we are thus represented to, we can recognize that, and how, 
this is so; most pertinently, we can appreciate what it is that is thus represented to 
us as so.”
These necessary, though not sufficient, conditions are intended to capture the particular 
flavour  of  representationalism that  Travis  attributes  to  his  opponents,  who include 
Martin Davies, Gilbert Harman, John McDowell, Colin McGinn, Christopher Peacocke, 
John Searle, and Michael Tye, amongst others (ibid. 58). To this list we might add Byrne 
(2009),  Siegel  (2010),  Brogaard  (ms,  2015b)  and  Schellenberg  (2011a,  2011b),  who 
defends a hybrid view comparable to Tye’s (2007) phenomenal externalism.
Travis’s use of “representing things as so” in (i) might be taken to suggest that p-
representation must be conceptually structured, rather than non-conceptual. However, 
since two of his stated targets — namely, Peacocke (1992a) and Tye (1995) — explicitly 
endorse forms of non-conceptual content, we can assume that Travis intends for his 
argument to apply to both conceptual and non-conceptual views. Similarly, while the 
wording  of  (i)  and  (ii)  above  might  suggest  that  p-representation  is  necessarily 
propositional, i.e. assessable for truth or falsity, a broader interpretation of Objectivity 
admits  of  any  form  of  content  that  possesses  accuracy  conditions — a  notion  that 
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admits of varying degrees — that relate to the states of mind-independent objects and 
their properties. , 6 7
In  what  follows,  I  will  be  primarily  concerned  with  Travis’s  Face  Value  and 
Availability  conditions, both of which are central to his argument from looks. Before 
presenting the details of this argument,  it  will  therefore be useful to examine these 
conditions in greater detail, along with some considerations that motivate them.
2.1. Face Value
Part  of  the  appeal  of  representationalism  stems  from  the  intuitive  idea  that  every 
experience has a single and determinate ‘face value’ at which it may be accepted or 
declined, as captured in Travis’s Face Value condition.  It follows from this conception 8
of experience that they convey some particular ‘way’, or state of affairs, that things are 
perceived as being, i.e. a representational content whose accuracy conditions describe 
the circumstances under which that experience may be considered veridical. To accept 
an experience ‘at face value’ is to judge that things are the way that they appear. To 
decline its face value, or to withhold judgement, is to doubt or remain neutral about 
the  veridicality  of  one’s  experience,  respectively — as  might  occur  after  having 
knowingly  taken  a  hallucinogenic  drug,  or  when  wearing  inverting  lenses,  for 
example.  Such  content  is  typically  thought  of  as  being  systematically  related,  or 
identical, to the contents of perceptual judgements or beliefs that it would be natural 
for the subject to form on the basis of that experience (cf. Siegel 2010: 51). Crucially, 
however, perceptually experiencing the world to be φ does not commit the subject to 
believing that  φ  is  true,  though it  might  predispose  them towards forming such a 
 For a representationalist view that resists this broader interpretation, see Glüer (2009).6
 I  examine  whether  Travis’s  argument  may  be  successfully  extended  to  non-propositional 7
content in sect. 3.1 below.
 ‘Determinate’ is used here in the sense that is opposed to determinable, and in relation to the 8
assignment of contents to experience, rather than the determinacy of those assigned contents. 
The above claim is therefore compatible with the contents of experience being indeterminate in 
the sense of having vague, i.e. not fully determinate, accuracy conditions.
Final draft. Please do not cite or quote without permission.
Are the Senses Silent? Travis’s Argument from Looks "7
belief.  On  the  present  view,  then,  experience  is  distinct  from  judgement  or  belief 
simpliciter,  and  functions  as  a  “non-factive  propositional  attitude”  in  its  own right 
(Byrne 2009: 437).
The idea that experiences have univocal face-value content might seem so obvious 
or compelling to some that it can be difficult to understand how it could possibly be 
false. One way of rejecting Face Value, however, is to hold that such content only arises 
when  a  subject  judges,  or  otherwise  interprets,  her  experience  as  indicating  that 
something is the case. The proponent of such a view need not deny that perceptual 
beliefs have contents that are systematically related to, or causally dependent upon, 
experiences. Rather, the claim is that the resulting content is not itself derived from, or 
identical  to,  a  content  of  experience,  since  experiences  themselves  are  non-
representational. Thus, whatever tokening of content the representationalist takes to 
occur at the level of experience may equally be taken by the anti-representationalist to 
occur ‘downstream’ of experience at the level of judgement or belief-formation.  On the 9
plausible assumption that perceptual belief is explanatorily subsequent to experience, 
the latter need have no content independently of the former. This is Travis’s view.
A second way of rejecting Face Value is to deny that experiences have only one such 
content in favour of them having many; i.e. content pluralism (cf. Chalmers 2006; Crane 
2013).  In this  case,  Travis’s  argument may be applied iteratively to each individual 
content that the content pluralist  takes experience to have. Alternatively, one might 
hold  that  experiences  have  disjunctive  contents — for  example,  that  a  given  visual 
experience represents there to be a reddish-roundish-patch or a ball or a tomato, and so 
on, where each disjunct corresponds to some particular way that the world might be. 
This  view,  however,  is  compatible  with Face  Value,  since  we may regard the entire 
disjunction  as  constituting  the  face-value  content  of  experience,  and so  as  what  is 
‘given’ in perception. Whilst Travis (2004: 72–73) raises doubts as to the aptness of the 
 Mutatis mutandis for non-conceptual and/or non-propositional contents.9
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disjunctive conception of perceptual content,  his argument may equally be taken to 10
target views on which experiences represent multiple alternative states of affairs (cf. 
sect. 3.1).
2.2. Availability
Travis’s notion of “recognizing”, or availability as I will call it, is undoubtedly the most 
contentious of his four conditions, and admittedly less precise than one might hope. I 
take it, however, that this condition is motivated by constraints arising from Face Value 
and Givenness, since for an experience to have a face value that is given to the subject in 
perception, this content must in some sense be available to the subject such that they 
are in a position to accept or decline it. Were this not the case then, assuming that they 
were able to form any beliefs at all, subjects would simply find themselves ‘saddled 
with’ (to use McDowell’s term) beliefs about their perceptual environment without any 
means of consciously registering or reflecting upon the content of their experiences, 
thus making accepting or declining those contents impossible. Aside from special cases 
like  type-2  blindsight,  this  is  not  how  perceptual  experience  strikes  us.  More 
importantly for present purposes, it is not how representationalists characterise their 
view,  since  it  effectively  collapses  p-representation  into  a  form  of  sub-personal  or 
effect-representation.
Availability, then, has two main features. First, it requires the face-value contents of 
experience to be “recognizable”, or cognitively available, to the subject on the grounds 
that  “you  cannot  represent  things  to  people  as  so  in  a  way  they  simply  cannot 
recognize as doing that” (Travis 2004: 63). By extension, then, it must be recognisable 
that experiences involve some form of representation, though this may require a degree 
philosophical sophistication that need not be present in all cases (see below). Moreover, 
such contents cannot simply be the result of the subject representing to themselves that 
something is so — what Travis calls “autorepresentation” (ibid. 61) — as with judgement 
 Not to be confused with disjunctivism — a view that Travis endorses (Soteriou 2014, 2016).10
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or  belief.  Rather,  the  content  is  ‘given’  to  the  subject  in  perception  —  i.e. 
“allorepresentation”  (ibid.) — as  per  Travis’s  Givenness  condition.  Precisely  what  the 
relevant availability amounts to requires further specification,  but  I  take a minimal 
requirement  to  be  that,  for  any  given  experience,  perceivers  must  be  capable  of 
grasping how that experience represents the world as being — or, to put it another way, 
what it would take for their experience to be accurate or veridical. P-representational 
content is therefore content for the subject.
The second main feature of Availability is that it requires the content of experience 
to be available (in the relevant sense)  to the subject  in virtue of  the corresponding 
experience. This qualification is intended to rule out cases of conscious availability via 
some non-perceptual state, such as a judgement or belief, that is independent of, or 
explanatorily subsequent to, the experience in question. As noted above, it is entirely 
compatible  with  Travis’s  view  that  judgements  and  beliefs  have  representational 
content.  Rather,  what  is  at  issue  is  whether  experiences  per  se  have  content.  If  the 
proposed  content  were  only  recognisable  in  virtue  of  some further  non-perceptual 
state, then it could equally be claimed that the content should be attributed to this non-
perceptual state and not to experience.
Availability  does  not  require  subjects  to  be  routinely  aware  that  they are  being 
represented to, nor that they are capable of reporting the contents or representational 
nature  of  their  experiences  —  something  which  clearly  requires  a  degree  of 
philosophical and conceptual sophistication that may be lacking in many, or indeed 
most, subjects. Nor does it require that perceivers are capable of reliably determining 
whether the relevant accuracy conditions obtain, since they may be subject to some 
systematic practical or epistemic disadvantage, such as a persistent hallucination or 
illusion.  Rather,  in  order  to  p-represent  that  x  is  ψ,  the subject  must  be capable  of 
grasping both (i) what it would be for x to be ψ, and (ii) that the relevant experience 
conveys that x is ψ, even if on reflection they judge things to be otherwise. This grasp 
may be tacit or implicit, and need not involve any explicit thought or knowledge that is 
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attributable to the subject. Nevertheless, the relevant content must be tokened in a way 
that  is  capable  of  featuring in  the  subject’s  reasoning such that  they could form a 
conscious judgement or belief, or rationally justify such a belief, on the basis of it if 
required.
The precise formulation of this condition is delicate since one would not want to 
rule out the use of, for example, introspection or conceptual capacities, the exercise of 
which  enables  subjects  to  access  the  contents  of  experience,  provided  that  such 
capacities are not themselves responsible for tokening such content independently of 
perception. In particular, subjects should not merely infer the contents of experience on 
the basis of, for example, their background beliefs or prior learning in a way that is 
compatible with the falsity of representationalism. To avoid these problems, we can 
gloss Travis’s informal characterisation of Availability as follows:
Availability*: The representational nature and content of p-representations must be 
“recognizable”, or cognitively available, to the subject solely in virtue of the 
corresponding  perceptual  experience,  along  with  the  operation  of  those 
non-representational capacities necessary to facilitate such recognition.
It is an important question whether the above condition would be acceptable to 
Travis’s opponents, since much of his argument depends on it. However, some form of 
this  condition  does  appear  to  feature  in  many  representationalist  accounts  of 
experience. According to Susanna Siegel, for example, “the contents of an experience 
are conveyed to the subject by her experience” (2010: 28; emphasis added), whilst Alex 
Byrne (2009: 443) takes experiences to be belief-like states whose contents are available 
to  the  subject  on  the  basis  of  how  things  non-comparatively  look  (see  sect.  4.3). 
Nevertheless,  it  remains  open  to  the  representationalist  to  reject  such  a  condition, 
perhaps on the grounds that it over-intellectualises the nature of perception (cf. Burge 
2010),  thereby  generating  a  possible  line  of  response  to  Travis.  I  discuss  the 
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consequences of such a rejection in sect. 5 below, though Travis (2004: 84–93) also offers 
a separate argument against such views that I do not discuss here.
For present purposes,  however,  I  will  assume the above reading of  Availability, 
though the details are no doubt controversial and may require further refinement to 
make  this  condition  acceptable  to  proponents  of  the  target  view.  However,  since 
Availability, or something very like it, is entailed by both Face Value and Givenness, then 
the  onus  lies  with  the  advocate  of  perceptual  representation  to  give  a  satisfactory 
account of it.
3. The Argument from Looks
Travis’s argument from looks, as I will call it, is just one of the arguments in what is an 
extremely rich and complex paper (Travis 2004, 2013a).  It  aims to establish that  the 
notion  of  p-representation  that  I  sketched above  can  play  no  role  in  a  satisfactory 
philosophical theory of perception. If effective, this rules out a range of widely held 
views  concerning  the  existence  and  role  of  representational  content  in  visual 
perception, and by extension other perceptual modalities. Importantly, the argument 
leaves  open  whether  other  kinds  of  representation,  such  as  sub-personal  or  effect-
representation, may be attributed to perceptual states, though not to experiences as it is 
precisely  the  attribution  of  content  to  conscious  perception  that  Travis  opposes. 
Nevertheless, such positions constitute a substantial weakening of the target view, and 
so would still represent an important victory for Travis. The argument thus poses an 
important challenge to the representational view, though one that, as I argue in sect. 5, 
may ultimately prove surmountable.
Travis’s argumentative strategy is relatively straightforward. Representationalists, 
he claims, are committed to experiences being p-representational. The evidence for this 
comes from prominent representationalists’ own descriptions of their views, which I 
will  not  rehearse  here  (cf.  Travis  2004:  58–60).  However,  according  to  Travis,  the 
conditions  for  p-representation  cannot  be  jointly  satisfied,  since  Face  Value  and 
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Availability  are  mutually  incompatible.  Hence  visual  experiences  cannot  be  p-
representational, and so representationalism is false.11
The argument may be stated as follows:
P1 If visual experiences were p-representational then their content would be 
recognisable in virtue of how, in experience, things perceptually appear, or 
look [to the subject].  (Looks-indexing)12
P2 Visual  looks  are  incapable  of  making  p-representational  content 
recognisable since they are comparative and so equivocal between multiple 
contents.
P3 Thinkable  looks  are  incapable  of  making  p-representational  content 
recognisable since they are not wholly perceptual.
P4 There  is  no  further  notion  of  looks  that  is  both  wholly  perceptual  and 
capable of making p-representational content recognisable.
C1 (From  P2  through  P4)  The  content  of  visual  experiences  cannot  be 
recognisable on the basis of how things look [to the subject].
C2 (From P1 and C1) Visual experiences are not p-representational.
Travis’s first premise makes the pro tem assumption that the most plausible way for 
the  representationalist  to  satisfy  Availability  is  for  experiential  content  to  be 
recognisable to the subject — or “indexed” to use Travis’s term (ibid. 63) — on the basis 
of how things visually appear, or look.  This suggestion has prima facie  plausibility 13
 For alternative formulations of the argument, see Brogaard (2015a) and Raleigh (2015).11
 Slightly different versions of the argument may be derived depending on whether or not 12
appearances or looks are taken to be subject-specific, as indicated by the parentheses in P1 and 
C1, with corresponding versions of the following responses and objections applying to each.
 I take looks to be visual appearances, and so use these terms interchangeably.13
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since  how one tells  what  the  face-value  content  of  one’s  experience  is  presumably 
depends upon the visual appearance that is manifested through the phenomenology of 
that experience. That is not to say that appearances are themselves representational or 
to be identified with the contents of experience. Rather, the suggestion is that looks 
enable us to recognise such contents, in turn making them available to consciousness. 
Thus,  what  fixes,  or  determines,  p-representational  content  and  what  makes  that 
content  recognisable  may  be  two  different  things — the  former  consideration  being 
semantic, the latter epistemic. Whilst Travis does not always adequately distinguish 
between these two aspects of experience, Availability and Looks-indexing (i.e. P1) clearly 
concern the latter.
Premises two through four are  concerned with the various kinds of  looks that 
might perform such indexing, thereby making the resulting content available to the 
subject  in the sense described above.  Here,  Travis identifies two distinct  notions of 
appearance: “visual” and “thinkable” looks,  arguing that neither is capable of making 14
p-representational content recognisable since the former contravenes Face Value  (P2) 
and the latter Availability (P3). From this, along with what Travis takes to be conflicting 
constraints  arising  from  these  two  conditions  (P4),  he  concludes  that  experiences 
cannot be looks-indexed (C1), and so visual perception is not p-representational (C2). 
Assuming  that  vision  provides  the  strongest  case  for  the  attribution  of  p-
representational  content,  this  result  may be  taken to  generalise  to  other  perceptual 
modalities, though Travis leaves this step implicit.
The  argument  from  looks  aims  to  present  the  representationalist  with  the 
following dilemma. In order to defend their view, they must either (a) elucidate some 
notion of looks that is capable of making the relevant content available — something 
that Travis argues is impossible — by rejecting one of P2 through P4, or (b) reject Looks-
indexing,  or  one  of  Travis’s  other  conditions  for  p-representation,  substantially 
 I use the revised terminology of Travis (2013a) in preference to “looking like” and “looking as 14
if” (Travis 2004) for reasons described below.
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weakening and potentially undermining their view. To understand why this dilemma 
is pressing, however, it is necessary to gain a clearer understanding of Travis’s notions 
of  “visual” and “thinkable” looks, along with the reason why he thinks that no other 
notion of looks is capable of meeting the representationalist’s requirements.
3.1 Visual looks
Visual  looks,  or  looksv  for  short,  are  characteristic  ways  of  appearing  exhibited  by 
objects solely in virtue of their visual effects upon the perceiver. Looksv thus identify 
some visually detectable appearance that is generated by all of the things which share a 
given ‘look’ (Travis 2004: 69–70). For an object to lookv like a lemon is therefore for it to 
have the characteristic visual look that lemons typically (though not always) have — 
call this looking lemonish. Since looksv may be characterised in terms of an implicit or 
explicit comparison between objects that look like or resemble each another, they are 
often described as ‘comparative looks’ (cf. Chisholm 1957: 45).
To  see  why  this  generates  a  problem  for  the  representationalist,  consider  the 
following example. Many things, not all of which are lemons, share the property of 
looking lemonish. Moreover, anything that, in the relevant respect, looksv like a lemon 
also looksv  like  a  wax imitation lemon,  or,  to  the untrained eye under appropriate 
circumstances,  like a ripe lime,  a  lemon-shaped bar of  soap,  a  hollowed-out lemon 
façade,  a  cartoon  drawing  of  a  lemon,  and  so  on.  Crucially,  such  resemblance 
relationships are symmetrical. Thus, if something looksv  like a lemon, then a lemon 
also looksv like it. Each of these alternatives corresponds to a set of conditions under 
which the experience may be considered accurate or veridical,  and so constitutes a 
distinct representational content in its own right. Thus, for all that something might 
lookv  lemonish,  there are innumerable ways that  the world might actually be,  all  of 
which share that same visual appearance. As far as visual looks go, then, the same 
experience might equally be said to represent any, or indeed all, of the innumerable 
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ways in which it can lookv to me just like there is a lemon before me; i.e. that there is a 
wax imitation lemon, a hollowed out lemon-façade, and so on.
It follows from this, Travis argues, that nothing about an object’s lookingv  φ  can 
identify the content of that experience as representing φ; e.g. that something is a lemon, 
as opposed to one of its visually indistinguishable alternatives, or ‘ringers’. Note that 
while many of Travis’s examples involve high-level or ‘rich’ properties, such as being a 
lemon, this argument generalises, and so what goes for lemons also goes for peccaries, 
ovals, and blueness (Travis 2004: 73). In each case, the relevant lookv is also exhibited 
by a host  of  ringers,  which in the preceding cases would include pigs,  circles seen 
obliquely,  and  white  things  cleverly  illuminated  by  blue  light,  respectively.  Thus, 
according to Travis, looksv “do not decide any particular representational content for 
any given experience to have” (ibid. 69), and so fail to satisfy Face Value. Rather, visual 
looks  are,  in  an  important  sense,  equivocal  between  contents,  and  so  incapable  of 
making any one such content recognisable, as per P2.
One possible response to this line of argument is as follows:
Response 1: Experiences do not represent concrete states of affairs — e.g. there being 
a  lemon,  something  yellow,  ovoid,  etc. — but  rather  something’s  merely 
appearing lemonish (yellowish, ovoid, etc.) in a way that may be satisfied by 
any sufficiently lemon-like object, or combination of objects, that exhibit(s) 
the relevant appearance.
One way of fleshing out this suggestion would be to posit a notion of appearances 
that  lies  somewhere  between  a  purely  subjective  effect  upon  the  perceiver — the 
presence  of  a  given  sensation,  for  example — which  would  violate  Objectivity  (see 
below), and the representation of external objects’ appearance-independent properties, 
such as their shape, colour, and so on.  One such notion represents what we might call 15
appearance properties: looking lemonish, looking yellow, and so on. This approach, however, 
 Travis goes on to deny that there could be any such intermediate notion (sect. 3.3).15
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goes  against  the  standard  representationalist  account  of  appearances,  according  to 
which for some object o to look F is for the subject to represent o as being F, rather than 
to represent o as having the property of (merely) appearing F — call this F′. Thus, rather 
than  appearances  being  a  function  of  the  propositional  attitude  of  seeing  or 
experiencing, as per the standard account, on the present account they enter into the 
content of the experience. Since any object can, with sufficient setup, instantiate F′ even 
though it does not instantiate the property that typically causes it, i.e. F, such content 
can tell us little about the underlying appearance-independent properties of external 
objects. Even if the proposal works, then, which is doubtful, it comes at a considerable 
ontological and epistemic cost.
If,  on the  other  hand,  looksv  are  taken to  be  purely  subjective  then this  raises 
further questions about which cases should count as veridical. If experiences merely 
represent that, for example, o looks F, then this will be true, and so veridical, of any 
object exhibiting the relevant look in a way that potentially extends to cases of illusion 
and even hallucination, each of which involves something genuinely looking F.  This 16
again weakens the explanatory role of p-representation, in the worst case making the 
relevant content necessarily veridical, since every case in which an object looksv F to S 
will  be  one in  which it  is  (veridically)  represented by S  as  having the property of 
lookingv F, i.e. F′. In the absence of some further factor or mechanism that determines 
how the world would need to be in order for that experience to be veridical,  such 
contents  are  effectively  self-verifying.  As  such,  they  are  capable  of  indexing  only 
epistemically  narrow,  or  ‘thin’,  contents  concerning the state  of  the  subject’s  visual 
system or visual phenomenology, and not the mind-independent properties of external 
objects,  thereby  contravening  Objectivity  (cf.  Byrne  2009:  449–50).  But  since  this  is 
precisely the job that looksv were supposed to do, then such looks are either redundant, 
since they fail to explain how Availability can be met, or, if they do not perform this 
 In the case of hallucination, the ‘object’ in question may be of a non-standard kind; e.g. a brain 16
state.
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role,  they collapse  into  a  form of  sub-personal  or  effect-representation.  Either  way, 
Looks-indexing fails.17
A closely related suggestion is that experiences do not represent determinate states 
of external objects and their properties, but rather the entire range of scenarios that 
could generate a subjectively matching visual appearance, or what Peacocke (1992b) 
calls “scenario contents”. Such content may be expressed in terms of a disjunction or 
function from possible worlds to truth values that captures the range of ways of filling 
out space that generate the relevant visual appearance. On this view, looksv  do not 
determine only one way for the world to be, but rule in (or out) a range of possible 
configurations of the subject’s perceptual environment. Travis objects to such contents 
on the basis that the resulting looks “point in no one direction” (2004: 72), yielding a 
representational content that is “incoherent” (ibid.  73).  Indeed, one could argue that 
scenario  content  is  incompatible  with  Face  Value,  and  so  fails  to  constitute  p-
representation.  Nevertheless, if it is possible to accept or deny that the actual world is 18
one of the ways that a scenario content indicates, then this might be thought to offer 
the representationalist  a way round Travis’s  argument.  A potential  objection to this 
proposal,  however,  is  that,  in  the  absence  of  any  further  constraints  upon  which 
configurations of the subject’s environment can feature in scenario content, then such 
contents  do  not  pick  out  mind-independent  properties  of  external  objects,  but 
subjective properties of experience itself: that the perceiver is being appeared to F-ly, 
and so on. If so, then the proposal will fail to satisfy Objectivity and so does not qualify 
as a form of p-representation. Even if successful, however, scenario contents forgo a 
considerable  degree  of  determinacy  and intuitive  appeal,  since  no  specific  state  of 
affairs is singled out as ‘the’ content of experience, as well as requiring an account of 
 A similar  argument  may be  found in  Travis  (2005:  310)  concerning  the  extension  of  the 17
concept red.
 Cf. sect. 2.1.18
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propositions that can accommodate this. They therefore come at a similar epistemic 
cost to the representation of appearance properties described above.
A more palatable alternative is that just one of the many possible contents that a 
visual look may indicate — being a lemon, for example — is singled out as the face value 
of the relevant experience. In this case, the representationalist needs to explain what 
privileges that content over all of the visually indistinguishable alternatives (or indeed 
the disjunction of all  those alternatives) as the  content of experience. Moreover, this 
explanation must make it  possible for the subject to recognise that their experience 
represents this and not some ringer, and so can presumably can only draw upon facts 
that  are available to the subject  from a first-personal  perspective.  Either way,  what 
started  out  as  the  seemingly  intuitive  and  straightforward  notion  that  experiences 
represent  the  properties  of  objects  in  the  world  turns  out  to  require  considerable 
further explanation and/or theoretical  machinery to ground the relevant content in 
information  that  is  perceptually  available  to  the  subject,  if  indeed  this  is  possible 
(sect. 5).
3.2 Thinkable looks
Whereas visual looks relate to resemblances between objects, thinkable looks are “very 
much a matter of what can be gathered from, or what is suggested by, the facts at hand, 
or those visibly (audibly, etc.) on hand” (Travis 2004: 76). Thinkable looks, or lookst for 
short,  relate to some particular way that the world could be that is associated with the 
relevant  visual  appearance,  and  so  are  ideally  suited  to  making  p-representational 
content recognisable. Indeed, it is plausible that lookst just are those contents that visual 
experiences incline a perceiver to judge or believe under the circumstances (cf. Travis 
2004:  77),  corresponding to  what  Chisholm (1957:  44)  called ‘epistemic  looks’.  It  is 
doubtful, however, that the contents which are indexed by, or identical to, lookst are 
apparent to the subject solely in virtue of what is perceptually available in experience, 
as Availability requires.
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For example, if Arvo sees what he takes to be a lemon in front of him, then the 
relevant object lookst to him as if it is a lemon. But for all that, he might equally have 
taken the same object to be a lemon-shaped bar of soap had he enjoyed a qualitatively 
indistinguishable  experience  in  a  different  context — upon walking into  a  chemist’s 
shop,  for  example.  This  is  presumably  not  due  to  any  difference  in  the  visual 
information about the object that is available to him in the relevant experience since the 
two experiences are qualitatively indistinguishable, but a matter of what he takes to be 
the case on the basis of that information. (That both objects look to Arvo like lemons is 
irrelevant  here,  since  this  is  a  fact  about  Arvo’s  subjective  experience  that  is  not 
answerable to any mind-independent property of the external world, and so fails to 
satisfy Objectivity, as discussed above.) Rather, what differs between the two situations 
is not how things perceptually appear, but what the subject is inclined to infer on the 
basis of their total evidence under the circumstances. Such inferences are a matter of 
judgement  or  interpretation,  and  not  of  experience,  which  can,  on  standard 
assumptions,  only convey how things visually  (audibly,  tactually,  etc.)  appear.  It  is 
therefore difficult to see how perceptual experience alone could enable the subject to 
discern which perceptually indistinguishable possibility is represented therein.
Lookst involve a form of representation whose content, Travis (2004: 76) argues, 
cannot  be  ‘given’  in  perception since  it  is  already taken by  the  subject  to  be  true. 
Consequently,  lookst  are  in  danger  of  collapsing  into,  on  the  one  hand,  belief  or 
judgement, i.e. “autorepresentation”, or, on the other hand, merely “indicating” (ibid. 
67) what is expected under the circumstances, taking all the available evidence into 
account.  Whilst  this  is  presumably part  of  the  intended role  of  p-representation,  it 
cannot be what makes perceptual contents recognisable for the reason given above: it is 
not a (wholly) perceptual phenomenon, but an epistemic one. If, per impossibile, lookst 
were what made the contents of experiences recognisable, then they would do so in 
virtue of a state — namely, belief — that is, by all accounts, explanatorily subsequent to 
experience,  since  lookst  would  themselves  be  dependent  upon  the  subject’s 
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background beliefs. Thus, the content of experience would be recognisable in virtue of 
some further state supposedly formed on the basis of experience, and not solely in 
virtue of experience itself, thus contravening Availability and potentially leading to a 
vicious regress.
It might seem unproblematic to some representationalists for the relevant contents 
to be recognisable in virtue of beliefs or other states ‘downstream’ of experience (cf. 
Siegel 2010: 51). However, this cannot form part of an argument for the existence of p-
representational content since the contents of beliefs are supposed to depend upon the 
contents of experiences, and not the other way around, as well as contravening both 
Givenness and Face Value. Moreover, as noted above, that beliefs are representational is 
common  ground  between  representationalists  and  their  opponents,  and  so  strictly 
neutral between these two views. Consequently, thinkable looks cannot be what make 
p-representational content recognisable since the information that determines what is 
represented according to them is not available to the subject in virtue of how things 
perceptually appear. Thus, lookst are not wholly perceptual, as per P3.
3.3 Looks-indexing
Having ruled out both looksv and lookst as being what makes the content of experience 
available to the subject, the question arises as to whether some other notion of looks or 
appearances could do the job of indexing p-representational content. After all, we have 
as yet been given no reason to think that Travis’s notions of visual and thinkable looks 
are exhaustive. Travis goes on to claim in P4, however, that no such ‘hybrid’ notion of 
looks is possible.
Travis’s  argument  for  this  point  is  that  while  Availability  pushes  the 
representationalist towards visual looks, which contravene Face Value, Face Value itself 
pushes the representationalist towards thinkable looks, which contravene Availability. 
Thus, either (a) appearances are wholly perceptual, in which case they fail to pick out 
any particular way that the world must be in order for things to look the way they do, 
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and so are equivocal between contents, i.e. P2, or (b) appearances index, or are identical 
to,  the  contents  of  epistemic  states  that  are  themselves  supposedly  derived  from 
experience,  in  which  case  they  are  univocal  but  not  wholly  perceptual,  since  the 
information that is perceptually available to the subject is insufficient to identify the 
relevant  content,  as  per  P3.  The  dual  constraints  of  Face  Value  and Availability  are, 
according to Travis,  therefore in tension with one another such that they cannot be 
jointly satisfied by any one notion of looks.  If  this is  right,  then the very idea of a 
univocal, objective and wholly perceptual look is itself incoherent.
Nevertheless,  some of  Travis’s  critics,  including  Byrne  (2009)  and Schellenberg 
(2011b), argue that:
Response 2: Some further, e.g. ‘non-comparative’ or ‘phenomenal’, notion of looks is 
capable of satisfying both Face Value and Looks-indexing.19
I  consider  this  response  in  sect.  4.3  below.  However,  if  Travis  is  right  that  these 
conditions are irreconcilable, then experiences cannot be looks-indexed, and so P1 must 
be rejected. This yields a further response to the argument:
Response 3: Reject Looks-indexing.
This  brings  us  to  the  second  horn  of  Travis’s  dilemma,  on  which  the 
representationalist  faces  the  difficulty  of  specifying  how,  if  it  is  not  in  virtue  of 
appearances, Availability might be satisfied. To reject Availability outright would make it 
difficult to claim any substantive explanatory role for representational content at the 
level  of  experience,  thus  calling  into  question  the  very  notion  of  p-representation. 
Rejecting Face Value or any of Travis’s other conditions, however, similarly threatens to 
weaken or undermine the view. The dilemma is pressing in part because it is difficult 
to see what else could take the place of Looks-indexing  in making p-representational 
 Byrne  (2009)  also  claims  to  reject  Looks-indexing,  though  it  is  unclear  that  he  takes  this 19
condition to play the role that is described here.
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content  recognisable,  though  there  are  alternative  options  available.  As  I  argue  in 
sect. 5, however, each of the above responses places a substantial explanatory burden 
upon the representationalist that cannot be easily discharged in a way that decisively 
favours their view over competing anti-representationalist explanations of the contents 
of the resulting perceptual judgements, beliefs or actions.
4. Common Misinterpretations
Having established the basic structure of Travis’s argument, I now wish to examine 
some putative objections to  it  and how one might  respond to  them.  Each of  these 
involves  some misunderstanding that  has  become prevalent  in  the  literature.  They 
concern the semantics of ‘looks’,  the individuation of perceptual content,  and   ’non-
comparative’ or phenomenal looks, respectively.
4.1. The semantic objection
A number of commentators take Travis’s  argument to concern the semantics of  the 
term ‘looks’ and its cognates. Susuanna Siegel, for example, discusses the following 
objection to  the  representational  view:  “No actual  uses  of  looks  (or  looks  F)  and its 
cognates in ordinary English exclusively track what is presented in experience” (2010: 
59). Siegel attributes a version of this objection to Travis, who she claims “raises doubts 
that  any  actual  uses  of  looks  in  English  report  contents  of  visual  perceptual 
experience”  (ibid.  60).  However,  as  should  be  clear  from the  above  formulation  of 
Travis’s argument, it concerns the metaphysics and epistemology of appearances, and 
not the semantics of ‘looks’ in English or any other language. Consequently, even if, as 
Siegel suggests, no use of ‘looks’ were to track the alleged contents, the argument from 
looks  would  still  stand.  That  we  sometimes  describe  experiences  using  terms  like 
‘looks’, ‘appears’, and so on, is therefore beside the point.
Alex Byrne (2009) similarly takes Travis to be making a semantic point, claiming 
that “Travis is wrong to conclude that our ordinary talk provides no support for [the 
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content view]” (ibid. 444). Byrne rebuts this conclusion by arguing that “we use ‘looks’ 
to convey information about the non-comparative looks of things”, which he identifies 
with “the familiar ‘phenomenal use’” of ‘looks’ (ibid.  441; see below). However, this 
again misunderstands the role of looks in Travis’s argument. The point is not that our 
everyday  looks-talk  fails  to  support  representationalism,  but  that  perceptual 
appearances themselves are incapable of making p-representational content available. 
Appearances,  or looks,  are (according to Travis) either equivocal or non-perceptual, 
neither of which can explain the availability of perceptual content to the subject.
No doubt these misunderstandings are in part due to Travis’s (2004) identifying 
thinkable looks via the English locution “looks as if” in the indicative mood, and visual 
looks with “looks like”, which is typically (though not always) comparative. As Travis 
notes, the issue is complicated by the fact that each of these phrases can be used to 
signify  either  comparative  or  epistemic  looks,  making  them  ambiguous  between 
Travis’s  two  notions.  The  argument  from  looks,  however,  does  not  turn  on  these 
linguistic  points,  and the  above terminology is  subsequently  replaced with  “visual 
looks”  and “thinkable  looks”  in  Travis  (2013a).  Even in  the  original  version of  his 
paper,  Travis states that he means “to point to usage to distinguish two notions of 
looks” and that “[w]hat matters is that we are conscious of the differences between 
these  notions  when  it  comes  to  asking  just  what  notion  of  looks  might  serve  a 
representationalist’s purpose” (2004: 75–76). To reject Travis’s critique on the basis of 
whether  English  usage  tracks,  or  otherwise,  the  relevant  notions  therefore  fails  to 
engage  with  the  substance  of  his  argument  which  concerns  the  metaphysics  and 
epistemology of appearances, and not the semantics of ‘looks’.
4.2. The triviality objection
A second misinterpretation of Travis’s argument is that it concerns what determines or 
individuates the content of perceptual experience, rather than what makes that content 
recognisable.  According  to  this  version  of  the  argument,  Travis  aims  to  show that 
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appearances, as manifested in visual phenomenology, underdetermine the contents of 
experience, and so cannot be what fixes that content (cf. Burge 2010: 344). However, 
few, if any, representationalists take appearances to play this role, in part for that very 
reason. Indeed, most representationalists hold that the order of explanation is precisely 
the  other  way  around,  and  that  it  is  representational  content  that  determines 
perceptual appearances or phenomenology (i.e. intentionalism), and not vice versa. The 
objection,  then,  is  that  Travis  merely  establishes  what  is  already  common  ground 
between him and his opponents. Hence even if the argument from looks is valid, it is 
trivial or irrelevant, since representationalism does not require that perceptual contents 
are determined by appearances.
A version  of  this  objection  is  given  by  Siegel  (2010),  who argues  that  Travis’s 
question of establishing which of a range of possible contents a given experience has 
“seems flawed, driven as it is by the idea that demonstrable [i.e. visual] looks might fix 
contents of experience” (ibid. 62).  Siegel goes on to claim that looks are “irrelevant to 20
fixing the content of experience” (ibid.), as Travis would no doubt agree. However, the 
argument from looks does not concern what determines p-representational contents, but 
rather how those contents are recognisable, or available to the subject, such that one can 
‘read off’ or otherwise grasp the face value of one’s experiences. Indeed, one of Travis’s 
contributions to the debate is that he draws attention to this very distinction which has 
been ignored or glossed over by many other philosophers of perception.
The  triviality  objection  is  therefore  flawed  since  it  ignores  the  central  role  of 
Availability in Travis’s argument. Indeed, the suggestion that the content of experience 
is  determined  by  something  other  than  appearances  arguably  makes  the  problem 
worse, and not better, for the representationalist (sect. 5.1).
 By  “demonstrable  looks”,  Travis  means  visual  appearances  demonstrably  possessed  by 20
objects and which are not specific to any given subject’s experience. However, Siegel clearly 
takes this to mean visual looks, and the term is dropped in Travis (2013a).
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4.3. The phenomenal looks objection
A more pressing objection to Travis is the one to which I alluded in response 2 above: 
that  he  neglects  to  consider  a  further  ‘non-comparative’  notion  of  looks — namely, 
phenomenal looks, or looksp. These are characterised by Frank Jackson as
…being explicitly tied to terms for color, shape, and/or distance: ‘It looks blue to me’, ‘It 
looks triangular’, ‘The tree looks closer than the house’, ‘The top line looks longer than the 
bottom line’, ‘There looks to be a red square in the middle of the white wall’, and so on. 
That is, instead of terms like ‘cow’, ‘house’, ‘happy’, we have, in the phenomenal use, 
terms like ‘red’, ‘square’, and ‘longer than’.
(Jackson 1977: 33)
If looksp were capable of combining aspects of visual and thinkable looks such that 
they  are  both  wholly  perceptual  and  capable  of  making  face-value  content 
recognisable, then P4 of Travis’s argument would be false, and the argument would fail 
to  go through.  Indeed,  Byrne (2009)  and Brogaard (ms,  2015b)  argue that  Travis  is 
himself  committed  to  the  existence  of  some  such  notion  of  looks,  based  on  his 
definition of visual looks, which is as follows:
[S]omething looks thus-and-so, or like such-and-such, where it looks the way such-and-
such, or things which are (were) thus-and-so, does (would, might) look.
(Travis 2004: 69–70)
Unpacking  the  somewhat  convoluted  grammar  of  this  passage,  it  is  apparent  that 
‘looks’ appears in both the explanandum (“looks thus-and-so, or like such-and-such”) 
and explanans (“looks the way … does”). If both occurrences are supposed to refer to 
comparative looks then Travis’s  definition would be circular  since looksv  would be 
defined in terms of themselves, yielding an apparent regress.  The latter use of ‘looks’, 21
 The regress is merely apparent since, provided that for all Fs, lookingv F can be defined in 21
terms of lookingv G, where F and G are non-identical, and lookingv G is not itself defined in 
terms  that  appeal  to  lookingv  F,  then  no  regress  is  generated,  as  is  consistent  with  the 
comparative analysis of looksp below.
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Byrne  and  Brogaard  argue,  must  therefore  refer  to  some  further  non-comparative 
notion  of  looks.  Since  these  are  presumably  not  epistemic  looks,  then  Travis  is 
committed to the existence of non-comparative phenomenal looks, i.e. looksp, in terms 
of which his other two notions may be defined.
The above objection, however, is flawed. First, as discussed below, it is not clear 
that phenomenal looks, if there are such things, are non-comparative. Second, despite 
Travis’s use of examples like “looks like a Vermeer” (ibid. 75) or looking “as if Pia will 
sink the putt” (ibid. 78), his argument applies equally to so-called ‘visual primitives’ 
like  looking blue  or  looking triangular — precisely  the  terms in  which Jackson defines 
phenomenal looks.  According to Travis, looksp  are equally susceptible to ringers — 22
e.g. looking white-in-blue-light, or looking like a tetrahedron seen face-on, respectively 
— and  so  are  similarly  equivocal  between  contents.  Moreover,  it  is  controversial 
whether there is any such set of primitives in terms of which all visual appearances 
may  be  defined,  and  if  so,  precisely  what  they  are.  While  this  is  presumably  an 
empirical  matter  that  may be investigated via  scientific  study of  the  human visual 
system, in the absence of such knowledge it is unclear how naïve subjects are supposed 
to be capable of grasping what is represented to them in experience if they are unaware 
of what the relevant primitives are (sect. 5.1). Nor should such knowledge be necessary 
in order to interpret one’s own visual experiences.
Travis’s  definition  of  looksv,  if  indeed  it  is  such,  is  intended  to  highlight  the 
fundamentally comparative nature of visual looks. However, we could equally well 
replace it with the following alternative analysis:
x  looksv  F  [to S]  iff  x  has visually relevant similarities [from S’s  point of view, under 
relevant circumstances k] to paradigm exemplars of F.23
 Notably, Jackson, who is often cited as a defender of the existence of phenomenal looks, takes 22
them to ground a form of sense-datum theory, and not representationalism.
 Cf. Brewer (2006: 169).23
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According  to  Brewer  (2006,  2007,  2011),  looks  are  grounded  in  similarity  relations 
between objects in virtue of their visually detectible properties.  Thus, for something 24
to  look  red,  for  example,  is  for  it  to  possess  visually  relevant  similarities  to 
paradigmatically  red  things,  such  as  a  ripe  tomato  seen  in  full  daylight.  Brewer’s 
notion of a “visually relevant similarity” may in turn be cashed out in terms of the 
primitive  dispositions  of  perceivers  to  judge  that  two  stimuli,  under  contextually-
determined circumstances k,  are similar in some visually detectible respect,  such as 
their  colour  or  shape.  Importantly  for  Brewer,  perceivers  need  not  be  consciously 
aware of these similarities. Rather, the relevant similarities need merely exist in order 
for  the  corresponding  looks  claims  to  obtain.  Thus  lookingv  is  not,  for  Brewer,  a 
representational notion.
Crucially  for  present  purposes,  Brewer’s  comparative  analysis  of  looks  may 
equally be applied to looksp,  with even supposed visual primitives like looking blue, 
looking triangular  etc.  being analysed as  involving an implicit  comparison.  If  this  is 
correct,  then  Byrne  and  Brogaard’s  objection  to  Travis  collapses  since  the  terms 
‘appearance’ or ‘look’ do not appear on the right-hand side of the above biconditional, 
thereby avoiding the alleged regress.  Furthermore,  Travis’s argument against looksv 
may  now  be  applied  to  looksp  which,  when  analysed  in  comparative  terms,  are 
similarly equivocal between contents, and so cannot satisfy Looking-indexing. Whether 
or not looksp  are comparative or not is therefore a central question that needs to be 
addressed  by  any  proponent  of  the  phenomenal  looks  objection.  Indeed,  in  the 25
absence of independent grounds for preferring Byrne and Brogaard’s non-comparative 
analysis of looksp over more parsimonious comparative accounts (cf. Martin 2010), the 
argument  between  Travis  and  the  representationalist  remains  a  stand-off,  with  the 
mere availability of the comparative analysis effectively neutralising the phenomenal 
looks objection.
 Cf. Martin (2010), who takes looks to be properties of external objects.24
 See Martin (2010) and Brogaard (ms, 2015b) for further discussion.25
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No doubt more remains to be said on both sides about this kind of defence of 
Travis’s  P4.  However,  neither are phenomenal  looks the knock-down  objection that 
Byrne and Brogaard appear to suggest. The difficulty for the representationalist is that 
the connection between lookingp ψ and representing ψ cannot be taken for granted — for 
example,  on  semantic  grounds — since  this  is  part  of  what  is  at  issue  in  Travis’s 
argument  from  looks.  Consequently,  the  argument  cannot  be  dismissed  simply  by 
appealing to phenomenal looks, since (a)  such looks may be implicitly comparative, 
and so equivocal in terms of their content, and (b) it is unclear that looksp are capable of 
making objectively assessable content available, as opposed to, for example, denoting 
purely subjective states of the perceiver (cf. Glüer 2009; sect. 3.1). So, while it remains 
open to the representationalist  to argue that a ‘non-comparative’ or ‘thin’ notion of 
looks  is  capable  of  making  perceptual  content  recognisable,  as  per  response  2,  it 
remains to be shown that looksp can play this role.
5. The Challenge for Representationalism
Setting the above misunderstandings aside, Travis’s challenge to the representationalist 
may be stated as follows:
(i) If  visual  experiences  were  p-representational,  then  their  contents  should  be 
“recognizable”, or cognitively available,  to the subject solely in virtue of their 
having  the  relevant  experience,  as  per  Availability*  (sect.  2.2).  Plausibly,  this 
occurs on the basis of how, in experience, things perceptually appear, or look, to 
the subject (Looks-indexing).
(ii) But visual looks (looksv) are comparative, and so equivocal between a potentially 
infinite series of  objectively assessable contents or states of  affairs.  Looksv  are 
therefore incapable of making the relevant face-value content available. (To this 
we might  add that  phenomenal  looks  are  similarly  unsuited  to  making such 
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contents available since (a) they too may be implicitly comparative, and (b) they 
arguably lack objective import; i.e. they have narrow or ‘thin’ contents.)
(iii) Thinkable or epistemic looks (lookst), on the other hand, draw upon the subject’s 
beliefs in a way that is incompatible with their being constitutive of perceptual 
experience, since experience is supposed to be explanatorily prior to judgement. 
Rather, lookst are perceptual ‘takings’ — “autorepresentation” in Travis’s terms — 
formed  on  the  basis  of  experience,  but  that  go  beyond  what  is  perceptually 
available to the subject, and so are not wholly perceptual. Moreover, the resulting 
contents — of  beliefs,  for  example — cannot  themselves  constitute  evidence  for 
experience being p-representational, since their existence is compatible with the 
falsity of representationalism.
Assuming, pace responses 1 and 2 above, that no further notion of looks is available, the 
representationalist now faces the following choice. Either:
(a) perceptual content is consciously available to the subject, but not in virtue of how 
things appear, or look, and so Looks-indexing is false (response 3); or
(b) perceptual content is not consciously available to the subject, and so Availability is 
false (response 4).
The  problem  with  (a)  is  that  it  remains  to  be  explained  how,  if  not  in  virtue  of 
appearances,  perceptual content is cognitively available to the subject.  The problem 
with (b) is that if such contents are not available to the subject, then it is difficult to see 
how they can play any substantive role  in the subject’s  conscious mental  life,  thus 
undermining much of the initial motivation for representationalism. I examine each of 
these alternatives further in the subsections below.
Alternatively,  the  representationalist  might  wish  to  deny  one  of  Travis’s  other 
conditions for p-representation, i.e.
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Response 5:  Reject Objectivity, Face Value and/or Givenness
However, this too has the effect of significantly weakening the view since each of these 
conditions is closely connected, both with each other and with Looks-indexing.
5.1. Rejecting Looks-indexing
At  this  point,  it  might  be  objected  on  behalf  of  representationalism  that  p-
representational content is not cognitively available ‘in virtue of’ any particular feature 
of  experience,  such  as  appearances,  but  simply  available  full  stop.  That  is,  it  is 
constitutive of perceptual representation that its content is available to the subject, and 
not something that needs to be ‘added on’ after the fact; e.g. in virtue of how things 
look. This objection is a version of response 3, since it denies Looks-indexing in favour of 
some other way of satisfying Availability.
One  worry  about  this  response  is  that  it  threatens  to  render  the  phenomenal 
character of experience superfluous in the manner of what Mark Johnston calls “The 
Wallpaper View” (Johnston 2006: 260). According to this view, phenomenal character is 
a “mere accompaniment” (ibid.) or by-product of experience rather than part of any 
mechanism by which content is made manifest to the subject. As a result, subjects are 
‘saddled  with’  perceptual  content  irrespective  of,  and  independently  from,  the 
phenomenal  character  of  experience.  This  seems  contrary  to  the  way  that  many 
representationalists  characterise  their  view  as  involving  the  ‘conveying’ — Siegel’s 
(2010:  28)  term — of  content  to  the  subject  by  experience,  rather  than  such  content 
merely being self-evident as in the case of belief or judgement.
Assuming that the representationalist means to provide some positive story about 
how representational content is available to the subject if not in virtue of how things 
look, we need to distinguish between the following two questions:
(1) Individuation  question:  What  determines,  or  individuates,  p-representational 
content?
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(2) Availability  question:  what  makes  p-representational  content  recognisable,  or 
cognitively available, to the subject?
While  (1)  has  attracted  no  shortage  of  philosophical  responses:  anti-individualism 
(Burge  1979;  2010),  biosemantics  (Millikan  1993),  asymmetric  dependency  (Fodor’s 
1987),  informational  content  (Dretske’s  1994),  demonstrative  content  (Burge  1991; 
McDowell 1994; Brewer 1999), conceptual and/or discriminatory capacities (McDowell 
1994; 2008), to name but a few, (2) has barely begun to show up on the philosophical 
radar. This is problematic because many of the factors that representationalists have 
taken  to  determine  or  individuate  the  content  of  experience — distal  or  proximal 
stimuli, counterfactual dependencies, historical facts about the evolution of the visual 
system,  and  so  on — are  ones  to  which  perceivers  lack  independent  first-personal 
access. Assuming that p-representational content is supposed to play some substantive 
role in our mental lives — indeed, if, as per Face Value, we are supposed to be able to tell 
or  otherwise  grasp  how  our  experiences  represent  the  world  as  being — then  the 
representationalist must explain how this is possible given the apparent inaccessibility 
of the factors that determine such content. That is, they must answer the availability 
question.
Travis’s challenge to the representationalist, then, lies in requiring an answer to 
both of the above questions in a way that disambiguates at the conscious level between 
the multiple possible contents that perceptual experiences could have. Thus, it is not 
sufficient to respond to Travis by explaining what gives experiences their contents. One 
must also explain how it is possible for those contents to be cognitively available to the 
subject in thought, reasoning and action. Moreover, in order to constitute an argument 
in favour of representationalism, this explanation must be one that genuinely favours 
this view over non-representational alternatives, such as purely relational (Campbell 
2002), object-based (Brewer 2006), or Naïve Realist (Martin 2002, 2006; Kalderon 2007) 
views of experience.
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While both representationalists and anti-representationalists accept an explanatory 
role for mental content, they differ as to whether this should be thought of as occurring 
within perceptual experience, or only judgements and beliefs, respectively. A further 
difficulty for the representationalist, then, is that whatever explanation they give for 
how  experiences  get  their  contents  such  that  those  very  contents  are  consciously 
available to the perceiver, can also be co-opted by the anti-representationalist to explain 
how the corresponding perceptual judgements and/or beliefs get their contents. This in 
turn highlights an important commonality between these apparently competing views 
concerning the tokening of mental contents that places an emphasis upon the nature 
and functioning of what we might call perceptual discriminatory capacities, whether 
these are operative at the level of experience, as the representationalist would have it, 
or  in  judgement  or  belief,  as  anti-representationalists  claim.  Whether  any  of  the 
standard representationalist views can satisfy these constraints, and indeed how anti-
representationalists  themselves  solve  the  problem  of  tokening  belief-contents, 
constitute important and under-explored questions that arise directly out of Travis’s 
argument from looks.
5.2. Rejecting Availability
The rejection of Availability, i.e. response 4, is compatible with representational content 
forming part of a causal explanation of the sub-personal mechanisms of perception, 
such as one might find in neuroscience, for example. It  does not,  however, support 
representationalism as it is here formulated, since the resulting contents are not contents 
of any conscious experiential state.  Indeed, this threatens to undermine the very basis 26
of representationalism, since, as Travis might put it, if it is not apparent to me what my 
experiences represent, then in what sense can they be said to represent anything at all, 
and to whom? The point here is not that only conscious agents may be represented to, 
but that the appeal to a familiar metaphor — namely, experiences ‘representing’ various 
 For a representational view of this kind, see Burge (2010).26
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external  objects,  or  states  of  affairs,  to  the  subject — has  been  replaced  by  a  much 
weaker, highly technical notion of representation that is quite distinct from conscious 
experience. This severely limits the explanatory role of the resulting contents, which 
collapse into mere sub-personal representation.
This in turn highlights that Travis’s challenge to representationalism does not so 
much concern the existence of perceptual content as its explanatory role. On the one 
hand, intentionalism emphasises the role of representational content in explaining the 
phenomenal character of experience. However, it is unclear how the resulting contents 
extend beyond this to represent the objective states and properties of external objects, 
thus yielding a form of ‘thin’ or narrow content. Such a view is, according to Travis, 
incompatible with the role of p-representation in informing us how the world is, or 
justifying our beliefs and judgements about anything beyond the subjective quality of 
experience itself. The epistemic or justificatory role of p-representation, on the other 
hand, requires that contents have objective purport, and so are assessable with respect 
to worldly objects and their properties. However, it is no longer clear how it is possible 
for such contents to be cognitively available to the subject on the basis of perceptual 
experience  alone.  Thus  the  representationalist’s  explanation  of  perceptual 
phenomenology and the epistemic role of p-representation appear to be in tension with 
each  other.  Indeed,  it  is  precisely  this  tension  that  is  highlighted  by  Travis  in  his 
contrast between visual and thinkable looks. Whether it  is reconcilable will  depend 
upon precisely what one takes the explanatory role, or roles, of perceptual content to 
be.
A decisive argument in favour of representationalism, then, must either (a) identify 
some unique role that the representational content of experience is supposed to play 
which cannot be adequately explained, or is superior to the explanation given, by its 
anti-representationalist  opponents,  or  (b)   identify  some  distinctive  mechanism  by 
which experiential contents are tokened such that they are cognitively available to the 
perceiver,  but  which  cannot  in  turn  be  co-opted  by  the  anti-representationalist  to 
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explain the contents of the resulting perceptual judgements or beliefs. I am aware of no 
such views in current philosophy of perception. However, that is not to say that such a 
view  could  not  be  defended — for  example,  by  giving  an  account  of  perceptual 
discriminatory capacities that both token and make perceptual contents consciously 
available. Thus, while identifying a number of important constraints upon the notion 
and explanatory role(s) of p-representation, Travis’s argument ultimately falls short of 
ruling out its existence entirely.
6. Conclusion
Despite  its  intuitive  appeal,  the  claim that  perceptual  experience  is  in  some  sense 
representational  is  neither  obviously  nor  trivially  true.  While  I  have  argued  that 
Travis’s argument from looks does not entirely rule out this possibility, it does offer a 
useful way of sharpening the nature of the disagreement between representationalists 
and their opponents, as well as hinting at a possible reconciliation centring upon the 
role of perceptual discriminatory capacities in both tokening and allowing cognitive 
access to the contents of experience and/or perceptual belief.
By highlighting the various theoretical commitments and explanatory roles that 
representationalists have taken perceptual content to satisfy, Travis puts pressure upon 
the suggestion that all of these can be played by a single such content, if indeed they 
can be satisfied at all. This emphasises the need for greater clarity about the precise 
explanatory role, or roles, of perceptual content; i.e. not only what it represents, but at 
which  level  (e.g.  personal  or  sub-personal),  and precisely  how this  is  supposed to 
explain  phenomenal  character,  the  content  of  belief,  the  justification  of  perceptual 
knowledge, and so on, or some combination thereof. Moreover, in order to constitute 
an  argument  for  representationalism,  this  must  be  done  in  a  way  that  genuinely 
favours the view over parallel anti-representationalist explanations of the contents of 
perceptual beliefs or judgements. To do so requires considerably more argumentation 
than Travis’s  opponents  have yet  provided.  To that  extent,  Travis’s  argument  from 
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looks remains a serious challenge to a wide range of views that appeal to the existence 
of representational content in perceptual experience.
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